ModernityBlog

“Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character, give him power.” Abraham Lincoln

Archive for July 2008

Not Even The Wooden Spoon.

with one comment

China’s rulers have lied again and wouldn’t even receive a wooden spoon for their non-existent efforts in the field of human rights, as Reuters reports:

“HONG KONG, July 29 (Reuters) – Rights group Amnesty International slammed China for failing to honour its Olympic human rights pledges in a report summarising Beijing’s “deteriorating” record over the past seven years.

With just over a week to go before the Games kick off in Beijing’s bird’s nest stadium on Aug. 8, Amnesty on Tuesday gave a scathing assessment of China’s track record since 2001, when it won the right to host the 2008 Olympics amid pledges to improve its human rights performance in line with Olympic ideals.

“There has been no progress towards fulfilling these promises, only continued deterioration,” said Amnesty in the report, titled “The Olympics countdown – broken promises”.

“The authorities have used the Olympic Games as pretext to continue, and in some respects, intensify existing policies and practices which have led to serious and widespread violations of human rights,” it said in the report released in Hong Kong.

Amnesty said Chinese authorities had targetted human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers to “silence dissent” ahead of the Games, jailing the likes of Hu Jia, Ye Guozhu and Yang Chunlin and often intimidating their families.

“China really needs to be releasing human rights activists, in order to be showing it’s following through with its promises,” said Mark Allison, a China researcher for Amnesty in Hong Kong.

The International Olympic Committee was also blamed for failing to put more pressure on China and for “sending a message that it is acceptable for a government to host the Olympic Games in an atmosphere characterised by repression and persecution”.

The spring unrest in Tibet and subsequent crackdown was highlighted as an instance of China overstepping its bounds in persecuting people without charge, and of shutting out foreign reporters in violation of its promise to grant full media freedoms for foreign journalists in the run-up to the Games. “

AI: Chinese authorities’ broken promises threaten Olympic legacy:

“The Chinese authorities have broken their promise to improve the country’s human rights situation and betrayed the core values of the Olympics, according to a new Amnesty International report.

Published to mark the 10-day countdown to the Games, the report evaluates the performance of the Chinese authorities in four areas related to the core Olympic values of ’universal fundamental ethical principles’ and ‘human dignity’: these include persecution of human rights activists, detention without trial, censorship and the death penalty.

The Olympics Countdown: Broken Promises concludes that in most of these areas human rights have continued to deteriorate since the previous Amnesty International report The Olympics Countdown: Crackdown on Activists Threatens Olympic Legacy, which was published in April this year.

Housing rights activist Ye Guozhu continues to serve his four-year sentence for “picking quarrels and stirring up trouble” because of his opposition to the seizure and demolition of property to make way for new construction projects for next month’s Olympic Games.

Ye Guozhu’s prison sentence was due to expire on 26 July. Instead the Chinese authorities say, he will remain imprisoned until at least 1 October, after the end of the 2008 Olympic Games.

China is still the world’s top executioner. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) initiated a review of the death penalty that is believed to have resulted in a significant drop in executions. A senior official said that in the first half of 2008 15 per cent of death sentences were rejected by the SPC.”

Update: The report is now on-line.

Written by modernityblog

29/07/2008 at 02:25

Posted in Uncategorized

Dehumanising.

with 6 comments

All of those close to the conflict in the Middle East become dehumanised, not least the victims of violence and the military forces involved.

The swagger, the heat, the adrenaline, the raw power, the power of the gun all go to the head.

B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights organisation, have highlighted yet another reason why Israel should disengage its forces.

The occupation and policing duties carried out by the soldiers have a corrosive effect not only on Israeli society but the individuals themselves and their victims.

Witness a blindfolded Palestinian being shot at close range with a rubber bullet.

What military purpose did that serve? How did that help secure Israel against attack? It didn’t, violence for the sake of itself.

B’Tselem reports
:

“Yesterday (20 July), B’Tselem published footage it received of a soldier firing a rubber-coated steel bullet, from extremely short range, at a Palestinian detainee who was cuffed and blindfolded. The act occurred about two weeks ago in the presence of several security forces, among them the battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel, who held the Palestinian’s arm while the soldier fired.

According to press reports, the Military Police have opened an investigation and arrested the soldier who fired the shot. Apparently, until the video was aired, the army did not conduct a Military Police investigation, and settled for an operational debriefing. According to the reports, the debriefing reached the desk of the Judea and Samaria (West Bank) Division Commander, who failed to inform the Military Police or the Judge Advocate General’s Office, or to take any measures against the soldier or the battalion commander. Residents of Ni’lin stated that, the day after the incident, they saw the soldier still serving in his unit.

When questioned by investigators, the soldier stated, according to press reports, that the battalion commander had ordered him to shoot the detainee. The commander, however, admitted only that he had ordered the soldiers “to frighten” the bound Palestinian.”

The video is here.

[Hat tip: Madam Miaow]

Written by modernityblog

26/07/2008 at 02:32

Posted in Uncategorized

Italy and Gypsies.

with 6 comments

The Italian government’s treatment of gypsies is appalling, Flesh is Grass explains it better than I ever could. Sadly such attitudes are not just confined to Italy.

Update: Fresh is Grass’s informative comments should be in the main post:

“In Greece this year they have been fighting to keep their children in the same school as non-Roma children whose parents object.

In Russia they have been campaigning against state-sanctioned discrimination in the criminal justice system and media hate speech unopposed by the state.

In Hungary, Roma are

Written by modernityblog

24/07/2008 at 02:48

Posted in Uncategorized

Radovan Karadzic and Denial.

with 4 comments

Radovan Karadzic’s arrest has spawned a rear guard action to defend him, but as with such tactics rather than flat denial of his culpability there is a conscious move to minimalise his role in numerous massacres and play down the number of those killed.

It is rather sick and perverse, but in the coming months we will no doubt see a few Machiavellian figures spread doubt about the massacre at Srebrenica. They realize that they cannot outright deny that there was murder at Srebrenica rather they down play events, muddy the waters and spread blame, thus minimising Karadzic and Mladic’s roles.

To fight those deniers, here are links to reports and discussions on those horrid events. I am indebted to Marko, his informed views on the Balkans are always worth a read, over at Greater Surbiton.

Srebrenica Genocide Blog

Srebrenica :: Investigations, Reports, Books

Domovina Net

Preliminary List of Missing and Killed in Srebrenica, [PDF]

Thirteen years since Srebrenica; thirteen facts to refute the theorists of an ‘anti-Serb imperialist conspiracy’

Mike Averko’s denial at Global Voices being answered, see comments
.

SREBRENICA: A CRY FROM THE GRAVE site. a
PBS documentary

Massacre in Srebrenica page at Haverford College.

Serbia condemned for Srebrenica despite acquittal on genocide charge.

UN RESOLUTION 53/35 (1998) SREBRENICA REPORT.

The Rohde to Srebrenica, case study in international human rights reporting at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism.

Written by modernityblog

24/07/2008 at 02:20

Posted in Uncategorized

Celebrating Samir Kuntar?

leave a comment »

Those Westerners tempted to celebrate the recent release of Samir Kuntar should read Adam Holland’s Kuntar crimes:

“Kuntar went over to Einat Haran and hit her head twice with the butt of his rifle, with the intent of killing her,” wrote the judges in their verdict. “The other defendant also struck her head forcefully. As a result of the blows, Einat suffered skull fractures and fatal brain damage, causing her death. They murdered the hostages – a helpless father and daughter, in cold blood.”

Written by modernityblog

22/07/2008 at 13:58

Posted in Uncategorized

The ICC.

leave a comment »

Of all the international organisations, I had high hopes for the ICC and the ICTY despite slow progress the recent indictment of the Sudanese leader, Al-Bashir, looks hopeful and now if Radovan Karadzic is carted off to The Hague then that is something, here’s a UN background PDF on the issue.

Update: ops, must remember not to post at 2 am and the difference between ICC and ICTY.

This is the ICC indictment:

ATTACHMENT A

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA


THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL


AGAINST


RADOVAN KARADZIC


 



AMENDED INDICTMENT



 


The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“the Statute of the Tribunal”), charges:


Radovan KARADZIC,


with GENOCIDE; CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR and GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, as set forth below


THE ACCUSED

  1. Radovan KARADZIC was born on 19 June 1945 in the municipality of Savnik, presently Republic of Montenegro, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

  2. Radovan KARADZIC was a founding member of the Serbian Democratic Party (hereafter SDS) which was established within the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia and Herzegovina) on 12 July 1990. From 12 July 1990 until his resignation on 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC was President of the SDS. In that capacity he also, inter alia, presided over meetings of the SDS Main Board.

  3. Radovan KARADZIC is a long-standing associate of Momcilo KRAJISNIK, former President of the Assembly of Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnian Serb Assembly) and member of the National Security Council and expanded Presidency of the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Serbian republic) and Biljana PLAVSIC, former member of the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting President of the Serbian republic, member of the Presidency of the Serbian republic and Vice- President of Republika Srpska.
  4. Radovan KARADZIC became President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic on 27 March 1992.

  5. Radovan KARADZIC, became a member of the three-member Presidency of the Serbian republic on 12 May 1992. On the same day Radovan KARADZIC was elected President of the Presidency.

  6. Radovan KARADZIC, together with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and other members of the SDS; served on the expanded Presidency of the Serbian republic from the beginning of June 1992 until 17 December 1992.

  7. Radovan KARADZIC, along with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, was a member of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Serbian republic from on or about the 30 November 1992.

  8. Radovan KARADZIC was sole President of Republika Srpska from 17 December 1992 until his resignation on 19 July 1996. From 20 December 1992, Radovan KARADZIC in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the armed forces presided over sessions of the Supreme Command.

COUNTS


  1. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992; participated in the below-charged crimes in order to secure control of those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been proclaimed part of the Serbian republic. Those areas include but are not limited to the municipalities of: Banja Luka; Bijeljina; Bileca; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski Petrovac; Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice; Celinac; Doboj; Donji Vakuf; Foca; Gacko; Hadzici; Ilidza; Ilijas; Jajce; Kljuc; Kalinovik; Kotor Varos; Nevesinje; Novi Grad; Novo Sarajevo; Pale; Prijedor; Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo; Sanski Most; Sekovici; Sipovo; Sokolac; Teslic; Trnovo; Visegrad; Vlasenica; Vogosca; Zavidovici; and Zvornik.

  2. In order to achieve this objective, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, and at relevant times Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, initiated and implemented a course of conduct which included the creation of impossible conditions of life, involving persecution and terror tactics, that would have the effect of encouraging non-Serbs to leave those areas; the deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the liquidation of others.

  3. Bosnian Serb forces including military, paramilitary, territorial defence and police units (hereafter Bosnian Serb forces), SDS and government authorities acting under the direction and control of Radovan KARADZIC, and at relevant times Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, were engaged in a variety of actions to significantly reduce the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of these municipalities.
  4. From late March to 31 December 1992, Bosnian Serb forces seized physical control of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9, often through violent attacks. These attacks and take-overs occurred in a co-ordinated and planned manner. Organisation and direction of the take-overs that occurred between late March and 31 December 1992 and the continuing acts of persecution and deportation that occurred up to 30 November 1995, in particular from the municipalities of Bijeljina, Banja Luka and the UN designated “safe area” of Srebrenica (hereafter Srebrenica enclave) and its surroundings, were provided by the SDS, military and police leadership, and the governing organs of Serb municipalities, including the Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions.

  5. Between 1 April 1992 and 30 November 1995, Bosnian Serb forces were also engaged in a forty-four month attack of Sarajevo, which involved inflicting terror on persons living within Sarajevo.

  6. Between 11 and 18 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces killed thousands of Bosnian Muslim men, who had been captured in several different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave.

  7. By 30 November 1995, this course of conduct resulted in the death or forced departure of a significant portion of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb groups from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 and in and around the Srebrenica enclave.

COUNTS 1-6

(GENOCIDE, COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, EXTERMINATION,

MURDER, WILFUL KILLING)





  1. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15;
    and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in Counts 1-6.


  2. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, acting individually or in concert
    with others, including Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, and between
    early March 1995 and 30 November 1995, acting individually or in concert with
    others, Radovan KARADZIC; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
    otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the
    destruction, in whole or in part, of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
    national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in several municipalities,
    including but not limited to: Bijeljina; Bratunac; Bosanski Samac; Brcko;
    Doboj; Foca; Ilijas; Kljuc; Kotor Varos; Novi Grad; Prijedor; Rogatica; Sanski
    Most; Srebrenica; Visegrad; Vlasenica; Zavidovici; and Zvornik. The destruction
    of these groups in these municipalities was effected by:
    1. the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats which took place during
      and after the attacks on and within the municipalities; the killing of Bosnian
      Muslims and Bosnian Croats in and after they had been taken away from camps
      and detention facilities; and the killing of Bosnian Muslims after their
      captivity in several different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave;

    2. the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
      Croats during their confinement in camps and detention facilities, and during
      their interrogations at these locations, police stations and military barracks,
      where detainees were continuously subjected to, or forced to witness, inhumane
      acts including murder, sexual violence, torture, beatings and robbery; and
    3. the detention of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in camps and detention
      facilities under conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical
      destruction in whole or in part of those national, ethnical, racial or religious
      groups, as such, more fully set out in Paragraph 30.


KILLINGS




  1. The killings by Bosnian Serb forces during and after the attacks on and
    within these municipalities include, but are not limited to:





    • the killing on or about 1-2 April 1992 of at least forty-eight Bosnian
      Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children in Bijeljina town -
      Bijeljina municipality;


    • the killing on or about 7-8 May 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslims and
      Bosnian Croats at the Crkvina warehouse – Bosanski Samac municipality;

    • the killing on or about 4 May 1992 of approximately ten Bosnian Muslim
      and Bosnian Croat males at the Hotel Posavina – Brcko municipality;


    • the killing on or about 10 May 1992 of thirty-four Bosnian Muslim and/or
      Bosnian Croat civilians of the village of Gornja Grapska – Doboj municipality;


    • the killing on or about 1 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or
      Bosnian Croat villagers from Jelec – Foca municipality;


    • the execution on or about 5 June 1992 of eighteen Bosnian Muslim villagers
      from Ljesevo – Ilijas municipality;


    • the execution on or about 30 May 1992 of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
      Croat villagers of Prhovo, including women and children, and the mass execution
      on or about 1 June 1992 of over one hundred Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
      Croat males from the village of Velagici – Kljuc municipality;

    • the killing on or about 13 August 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslim males
      of Dabovci village, and the killing in November 1992 of approximately one
      hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat males of Grabovica village
      – Kotor Varos municipality.


    • the killing on or about 23 July 1992 of approximately ten Bosnian Muslim
      villagers of Carakovo – Prijedor municipality;


    • the killing on or about 25 May 1992 of more than thirty Bosnian Muslim
      and/or Bosnian Croat women and children in the village of Hrustovo – Sanski
      Most municipality;


    • the execution throughout June 1992 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men,
      women and children of Visegrad at various bridges over the Drina, and the
      14 June 1992 killing of more than sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat
      villagers from Koritnik village -Visegrad municipality;


    • the killing on or about 2 May 1992 of approximately twelve Bosnian Muslim
      and/or Bosnian Croat males from the village of Drum, and the killing on
      or about 16 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men,
      women and children of the village of Zaklopaca – Vlasenica municipality;

    • the killing on or about 25 June 1992 of twenty-one Bosnian Muslim and/or
      Bosnian Croat civilians from Vozuca village – Zavidovici municipality;


    • the killing on or about 9 April 1992 of fifteen Bosnian Muslim and/or
      Bosnian Croat males from the town of Zvornik – Zvornik municipality.






  1. SDS and government authorities established camps and detention facilities
    in the municipalities. Following the attacks on the municipalities, Bosnian
    Serb forces rounded up tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
    and forced them to march to assembly points, for transfer to the camps and
    detention facilities. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were pulled from
    the columns during these marches and executed.


  2. Many thousands of those Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who survived
    the attacks and forced marches were taken to these camps and detention facilities,
    including but not limited to:






    • Manjaca in Banja Luka municipality, from about 21 April to 18 December
      1992;

    • Batkovic in Bijeljina municipality, from about 1 June to 31 December 1992;


    • the Vuk Karadzic school in Bratunac municipality, from 1 May to 31 December
      1992;


    • Luka in Brcko municipality, from 7 May to early July 1992;


    • Bare ammunition warehouse from 1 May 1992, Spreca prison from 1 May 1992,
      the SUP station from 1 May to 31 July 1992, Percin’s Disco from 1 May 1992,
      Sevarlije JNA barracks from 1 May to 30 June 1992, and the JNA hangars near
      the Bosanska plantation from May 1992, all in Doboj municipality;


    • KP Dom in Foca municipality, from 18 April to 31 December 1992;

    • Omarska from 15 May to 15 August 1992, Keraterm from 15 May to 6 August
      1992, and Trnopolje from 15 May to 30 September 1992 in Prijedor municipality;


    • Rasadnik/Sladara from 1 May to 31 December 1992 and Veljko Vlahovic School
      from 1 May to 31 August 1992, in Rogatica municipality;


    • Betonirka from 27 May to 7 July 1992 in Sanski Most municipality;


    • Susica from 2 June to early September 1992 in Vlasenica municipality;



    • Celopek Dom Kultur from 29 May to 30 June 1992, Ekonomija Farm from
      about 7 May to 22 May 1992, Karakaj Technical School from 29 May to June
      1992 in Zvornik municipality
      .





  1. These camps and detention facilities were staffed and operated by military
    and police personnel, under the ultimate direction and control of senior Bosnian
    Serb leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and
    Biljana PLAVSIC, more fully set out in Paragraphs 60-66.

  2. The killing by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats
    in these camps and detention facilities, or after they had been taken away
    from them, includes but is not limited to:






    • the May 1992 summary execution of Bosnian Muslim detainees in Luka Camp
      – Brcko municipality;

    • the killings through May and June 1992 of military aged Bosnian Muslim
      and/or Bosnian Croat male prisoners from Susica camp – Vlasenica municipality;


    • the killings in June 1992 of over thirty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
      Croats male prisoners at the Celopek Dom Kultur; the mass killing on or
      about 1-5 June 1992 of approximately one hundred and sixty Bosnian Muslim
      males at Karakaj Technical School; the killing on or about 5-8 June 1992
      of approximately one hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat
      prisoners at Gero’s slaughterhouse – Zvornik municipality;


    • the mass killing on or about 14 June 1992 of forty-seven Bosnian Muslim
      men from Rajlovac camp – Novi Grad municipality;


    • the execution on or about 15 June 1992 of at least ten Bosnian Muslim
      males from Visegrad – Rogatica municipality;


    • the execution on or about 20 July 1992 of over one-hundred and fifty Bosnian
      Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the “Brdo” region of Prijedor at
      Omarska camp; the execution on or about 24-25 July 1992 of approximately
      one hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males in Room
      3 of Keraterm camp; the mass execution on or about 21 August 1992 of approximately
      one hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from Trnopolje
      camp on Vlasic mountain in Skender Vakuf – Prijedor municipality;

    • the killing and repeated beating and torture over the month of July 1992
      of thirty-six Bosnian Muslim detainees in Foca KP Dom; the killing on or
      about 5 August 1992 of over twenty Bosnian Muslim male detainees from Kalinovik
      municipality who were taken to Foca KP Dom, and from there later killed
      near Jelec – Foca municipality.







  1. The 1992 take-overs, referred to in paragraph 12, gave the Bosnian Serb
    forces control of the majority of major municipalities in eastern Bosnia and
    the “ethnic cleansing” that followed and continued through 1993-1995, especially
    from the municipalities of Bijeljina and Banja Luka, forced the Bosnian Muslims
    and Bosnian Croats of these municipalities to leave. The Bosnian Muslims mainly
    fled into the thinly populated rural areas of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina
    that had so far escaped the attention of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Bosnian
    Muslim populations within those areas, including Srebrenica, swelled dramatically.


  2. On 16 April 1993, the Security Council of the UN acting pursuant to Chapter
    VII of its Charter, adopted Resolution 819, in which it demanded that all
    parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina treat Srebrenica, Zepa,
    Gorazde, Sarajevo and Tuzla (and their surroundings) as “safe areas” which
    were to be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act.


  3. On 8 March 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, as Supreme Commander instructed
    the Bosnian Serb forces to create an unbearable situation of total insecurity
    with no hope of further survival of life for the inhabitants of, inter
    alia
    , Srebrenica.


  4. On or about 6 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces shelled Srebrenica and attacked
    UN observation posts that were located in the “safe area”. This attack on
    the Srebrenica “safe area” continued until 11 July 1995, when combined forces
    from several units of the Bosnian Serb forces entered Srebrenica. The Bosnian
    Muslims who were in Srebrenica after the beginning on the attack took two
    courses of action in response.

    1. One group of several thousand Bosnian Muslim men, women and children fled
      to the UN compound in Potocari, which was located within the “safe area”
      of Srebrenica. On 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces separated the Bosnian
      Muslim men and boys from the women and children and detained them in and
      around Potocari. The women and children were later transported by buses
      and trucks to areas outside the enclave.
    2. A second group of approximately 15, 000 thousands Bosnian Muslim men along
      with some women and children fled in a huge column, through the woods towards
      Tuzla. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the retreating column were captured
      by or surrendered to the Bosnian Serb forces.





  1. Between 11 and 18 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces executed thousands of Bosnian
    Muslim men in an organised, widespread and systematic manner. In particular,
    those forces summarily executed Bosnian Muslim men at the places where they
    were detained shortly after they had been captured and at other sites to which
    they had been transported for execution.

  2. These killings were committed at several different locations in and around
    the Srebrenica enclave, including but not limited to:






    • the execution on or about the 12-13 July 1995 of numerous Bosnian Muslim
      men at diverse locations around the UN compound at Potocari;

    • the killings on or about the 12 to 15 July 1995 of numerous Bosnian Muslim
      men at various locations in and around Bratunac;

    • the execution on or about the 12 to 14 July 1995 of twenty-five Bosnian
      Muslim men near Tisca;


    • the execution on or about the 13 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim
      men who had been imprisoned in a large warehouse in the village of Kravica;

    • the execution on or about the 14 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim
      men at the Grbavci school complex and the nearby village of Orahovac (near
      Lazete) and ;


    • the execution on or about the 14 to 15 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian
      Muslim men in and around the “Dam” near Petkovci;


    • the execution on or about the 14 to 21 July 1995 of over hundred Bosnian
      Muslim men along a dirt road in the Cerska Valley;


    • the execution on or about the 14 to 16 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian
      Muslim men at the school at Pilica;


    • the execution on or about the 16 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim
      men at Branjevo Military Farm;

    • the execution on or about the 16 July 1995 of approximately five hundred
      Bosnian Muslim men inside the Pilica Cultural Centre;


    • the execution on or about the 17 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim
      men near Kozluk.



CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARM




  1. In the camps and detention facilities, referred to in paragraphs 20 and
    22, Bosnian Serb forces and others who were given unrestricted access to the
    camps, subjected Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees from the municipalities
    to physical and mental abuse, causing them serious bodily or mental harm.
    As a result of these inhumane acts, during the period from late March 1992
    to 31 December 1992, thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats died
    in these detention facilities.

CONDITIONS CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

  1. Conditions in the camps and detention facilities included inadequate food,
    often amounting to starvation rations, foul water, insufficient or non-existent
    medical care, inadequate hygiene conditions and lack of space.


  2. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or
    had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control
    were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 17 through 30 above, or had
    done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable
    measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.


  3. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC
    knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and
    control had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 17 through 30 above.
    Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
    to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:


Count 1: GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(a), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


Count 2: COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(e), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


Count 3: Extermination, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(b), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 4: Murder, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(a), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


Count 5: Murder, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


Count 6: Wilful killing, a GRAVE BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punishable under Articles 2(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNT 7

(PERSECUTIONS)






  1. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 16-32;
    and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 38-41 and 67-92 in count
    7.


  2. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting
    individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo
    KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992; planned,
    instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning,
    preparation or execution of persecutions of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat
    and other non-Serb populations of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9
    and the Srebrenica enclave. These persecutions included but are not limited
    to:

    1. the killing by Bosnian Serb forces of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and
      Bosnian Croats, during and after the attacks on the areas and municipalities
      listed in Paragraphs 17 and 18; in the camps and detention facilities as
      described in Paragraphs 20 and 22; and after their captivity in several
      different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave as described in
      Paragraph 28.

    2. the forced transfer or deportation by Bosnian Serb forces of tens of thousands
      of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non- Serbs from the municipalities
      listed in Paragraph 9, and Bosnian Muslims from the Srebrenica enclave;

    3. the inhumane treatment and/or torture of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats
      and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9. During
      and after the attacks on these municipalities, whether they were taken to
      detention centers, police stations, military barracks, private homes or
      other locations, Bosnian Serb forces subjected Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian
      Croats and other non-Serb civilians to brutal, inhumane treatment, which
      included beatings, sexual violence and death threats on a daily basis. Many
      were forced to witness executions and brutal assaults of other detainees;

    4. the constant humiliation and degradation by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian
      Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed
      in Paragraph 9. In the detention facilities, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat
      and other non-Serb males and females suffered egregious, inhumane conditions
      on a daily basis. Detainees were deprived of adequate nutrition, adequate
      medical care, hygienic sanitation facilities, and were forced to endure
      inhumane accommodations. The detainees subsisted in an atmosphere of constant
      terror fostered by random brutality. Physical violence, mental suffering,
      sexual violence and other degrading and humiliating circumstances that constituted
      fundamental attacks on their humanity were repeatedly inflicted upon the
      detainees;
    5. the denial of fundamental rights by Bosnian Serb forces to Bosnian Muslims,
      Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph
      9, including the right to work, freedom of movement, the right to judicial
      process, and the right of equal access to public services including proper
      medical care;

    6. the wanton destruction by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian
      Croat and other non-Serb cities, towns and villages in the municipalities
      listed in Paragraph 9. During and after the attacks on these municipalities,
      Bosnian Serb forces systematically destroyed Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat
      and other non-Serb cities, towns, villages and property, including homes,
      businesses and Muslim and Roman Catholic sacred sites. Buildings were shelled,
      torched or dynamited. The destruction was so extensive that nothing but
      portions of buildings and rubble remained in many of these municipalities.
      Buildings associated with the Serbian Orthodox religion remained untouched.




  1. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or
    had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control
    were committing the acts described in Paragraph 34 above, or had done so.
    Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
    to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.




  1. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC
    knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and
    control had committed the acts described in Paragraph 34 above. Radovan
    KARADZIC
    failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish
    the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:


Count 7: Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(h), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNTS 8-9

(DEPORTATION, OTHER INHUMANE ACTS)


  1. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 33-36; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in counts 8-9.

  2. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the forced transfer and deportation of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 and the Srebrenica enclave.

  3. From early April 1992, the organised forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 began. Between 1 January 1993 and 30 November 1995 the forcible transfers continued, especially from the municipalities of Bijeljina and Banja Luka.
  4. Between 11 July 1995 and 18 July 1995 thousands of Bosnian Muslims were forcible transferred from the Srebrenica enclave. As a result of these actions the Bosnian Serb forces virtually eliminated the presence of any Bosnian Muslims in the Srebrenica enclave area, thus further continuing an “ethnic cleansing” campaign which had begun in early April 1992.

  5. The Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and non-Serb groups were mainly deported to areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the internationally recognised government and to Croatia and Serbia. The forced transfers and deportations were organised by the Bosnian Serb police forces and other Bosnian Serb municipal organs operating at the direction of the Crisis Staffs. In many cases, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs were required to sign documents stating that they were turning over all of their property to the Bosnian Serb republic in order for Bosnian Serb authorities to allow them to leave or to release them from detention facilities.

  6. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 38 through 41 above, or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

  7. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraph 38 through 41 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:


Count 8: Deportation, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(d), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


Count 9: Other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(i), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNT 10

(UNLAWFULLY INFLICTING TERROR UPON CIVILIANS)


  1. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in count 10.

  2. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, individually or in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping upon civilian areas of Sarajevo and upon the civilian population thereby inflicting terror upon its civilian population.

  3. Shortly after Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationally recognised as an independent state on 6 April 1992, armed hostilities broke out in Sarajevo. Even before the conflict began, armed forces supporting the SDS and elements of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (hereafter JNA) occupied strategic positions in and around Sarajevo. The city was subsequently subjected to blockade, bombardment and sniper attacks from these positions. Much of the bombardment and sniping was from positions in the hills around and overlooking Sarajevo, from which the attackers had a clear, detailed and commanding view of the city and its population.

  4. On or about 20 May 1992, after a partial withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA forces surrounding Sarajevo were effectively transformed into the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Army of the Serbian republic.

  5. For forty-four months, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps implemented a military strategy that used shelling and sniping to kill, maim, wound and terrorise the civilian inhabitants of Sarajevo. The shelling and sniping killed and wounded thousands of civilians of both sexes and all ages, including children and the elderly.
  6. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps directed shelling and sniping at civilians who were tending vegetable plots, queuing for and collecting water or bread, attending funerals, playing and watching football, shopping in markets, riding on trams, gathering wood, or simply walking with their children or friends. People were injured and killed, even inside their own homes, hit by bullets targeted through their windows. The attacks on Sarajevo civilians were often unrelated to military actions and were designed to keep the inhabitants in a constant state of terror.

  7. Because of the shelling and sniping against civilians, the life of every Sarajevo inhabitant became a daily struggle to survive. Without gas, electricity or running water, people were forced to venture outside to find basic living necessities. Each time they did, whether to collect wood, fetch water or buy some bread, they risked death. In addition to the sheer human carnage that the shelling and sniping caused, the endless threat of death and maiming caused extensive trauma and psychological damage to the inhabitants of Sarajevo.

  8. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control, were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 45 through 50 above or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

  1. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 45 through 50 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:


Count 10: Unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


COUNT 11

(TAKING OF HOSTAGES)

  1. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in count 11.

  2. Between 25 and 26 May 1995 air strikes were undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereafter NATO) against Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  3. Between 26 May 1995 and 2 June 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the taking of UN military observers and UN peacekeepers as hostages, following the NATO air strikes on 25 and 26 May 1995.

  4. Bosnian Serb forces detained over two hundred UN peacekeepers and military observers in Pale, Sarajevo and other locations. They held them hostage by force at locations of strategic or military significance across Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to render these locations immune from further NATO airstrikes and to prevent the airstrikes from continuing. Some of the hostages were assaulted and otherwise maltreated during their captivity. Some of these hostages were forced to warn their UN commanders that they would be killed if NATO continued to bomb.

  5. During and after protracted negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, including Radovan KARADZIC, the UN hostages were released in stages between 3 and 19 June 1995.

  6. Between 26 May 1995 and 2 June 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 55 and 56 above, or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

  1. In addition, between 3 June 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 55 and 56 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:

Count 11: Taking of hostages, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(b) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY







  1. Radovan KARADZIC acting individually between 1 July 1991 and 19 July
    1996, or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo
    KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992; exercised
    both formal and/or de facto power and control over the Bosnian Serb
    forces and all SDS and government authorities who participated in the crimes
    alleged in this indictment.


  2. In particular, from 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992, mainly through his
    positions as President of the SDS, including President of the Main Board;
    President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic and President
    of the Presidency of the Serbian republic, Radovan KARADZIC, acting
    individually or in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others;
    directed and controlled the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government
    authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment:



    1. Radovan KARADZIC was President of the SDS and in that capacity
      was also, inter alia, President of the Main Board of the SDS. Effectively
      the Main Board was the main authority within the party’s hierarchy; it formulated
      the party’s policies and ensured they were put into effect. The Main Board,
      of which Momcilo KRAJISNIK was also a member from 12 July 1991, and SDS
      leaders exercised direct control over the activities and policies of all
      levels of the SDS, including the municipal boards. The Main Board ordered
      the creation of the SDS Crisis Staffs in municipalities where Bosnian Serbs
      lived. The chairmen of the SDS municipal boards were frequently the Presidents
      of or members of the Crisis Staffs. Crisis Staffs included military and
      police officials amongst their members. Crisis Staffs exercised complete
      executive, legislative and regulatory authority in the areas under their
      control and controlled the Bosnian Serb forces.

    2. From 28 February 1992 until 12 May 1992, Radovan KARADZIC acting
      in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, were jointly
      responsible for the deployment of the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence in
      peace and in war, and for the utilisation of the police in war and other
      emergency situations. This became particular evident when the Bosnian Serb
      Assembly created the National Security Council of the Serbian republic on
      27 March 1992. Radovan KARADZIC became President of the Council and
      Momcilo KRAJISNIK one of its members. The stated function of the National
      Security Council was to consider political, legal, constitutional and other
      issues of interest for the security of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
      Herzegovina. Radovan KARADZIC was of the view that decisions of the
      National Security Council should bind all the executive organs, the police
      and the government, particularly in urgent situations where decisions had
      to be taken on war, peace and other matters of national security. Until
      the Presidency was formed on 12 May 1992, the National Security Council
      was effectively the main body of authority in the Serbian republic.

    3. The National Security Council exercised its authority on 15 April 1992
      when it recommended an immediate threat of war be declared. That same day,
      signing as the Presidency, Biljana PLAVSIC and Nikola KOLJEVIC, declared
      the imminent threat of war and ordered the mobilisation of the Bosnian Serb
      Territorial Defence.

    4. On 12 May 1992 Radovan KARADZIC became a member of the three-member
      Presidency. On the same day Radovan KARADZIC was elected President
      of the Presidency. On or about 2 June 1992 the Presidency was formally expanded
      to include Momcilo KRAJISNIK and the President of the Government. From 12
      May to 17 December 1992 the Presidency was the Supreme Commander of the
      Bosnian Serb army in peace and war and of the Bosnian Serb police forces
      in war and other emergency situations. The Presidency decided on the deployment
      of the army in war; appointed, promoted and discharged officers of the army
      of the Bosnian Serb republic (hereafter VRS). In addition the Presidency
      received reports on the activities of units under its command.

    5. During the period 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb forces,
      SDS and governmental institutions were utilised by the Bosnian Serb leadership,
      including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC,
      to execute the crimes alleged within this indictment. In some instances,
      with the support and encouragement of Radovan KARADZIC and others,
      the Bosnian Serb forces, SDS and governmental institutions acted in concert
      with forces from the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

    6. On 17 December 1992 the Presidency was disbanded and Radovan KARADZIC
      was elected sole President of the Serbian republic. (Republika Srpska).





  1. Further, from 1 January 1993 until his resignation on 19 July 1996, mainly
    through his positions as President of the SDS, including President of the
    Main Board; President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic,
    President of Republika Srpska and Supreme Commander of the armed forces; Radovan
    KARADZIC
    , acting individually or in concert with others, directed and
    controlled the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities
    who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment:

    1. From 17 December 1992, Radovan KARADZIC was sole President of Republika
      Srpska and assumed all the powers of the Presidency, including that of Supreme
      Commander of the armed forces, as more fully set out in paragraph 61 (d).
      As Supreme Commander, Radovan KARADZIC, acting in concert with other
      members of the Supreme Command, commanded the armed forces.

    2. During the period 1 January 1993 to 30 November 1995, the Bosnian Serb
      forces, SDS and governmental institutions were utilised by the Bosnian Serb
      leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, to execute the crimes alleged
      within this indictment.





  1. In October and November 1991 the Bosnian Serb Assembly also authorised Radovan
    KARADZIC
    , Biljana PLAVSIC and other leading members of the SDS to “represent
    and protect the interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
    vis-à-vis federal and international bodies;” and to negotiate with
    Muslim and Croatian representatives on the organisation of future common life
    in Bosnia and Herzegovina.






  1. Radovan KARADZIC, both through the formal positions alleged above,
    and pursuant to his de facto power, also had the authority to punish
    or to initiate investigations or proceedings against any persons or members
    of the armed forces under his command who were believed to have committed
    crimes on the territory of the Serbian republic.


  2. Therefore, between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, both through the formal
    positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de facto power, Radovan
    KARADZIC
    knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under
    the Bosnian Serb leadership direction and control; were committing the
    crimes alleged in this indictment or had done so, and failed to take necessary
    and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.


  3. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC
    both through the formal positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de
    facto
    power, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian
    Serb forces under the Bosnian Serb leadership direction and control
    had committed the crimes alleged in this indictment, and failed to take the
    necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS


  1. All acts or omissions charged as Genocide or Complicity in Genocide, were committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

  2. All acts and omissions charged as Crimes against humanity were part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and/or other non-Serb civilian populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  3. From 6 April 1992, a state of international armed conflict and partial occupation existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  4. All acts and omissions charged as Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“grave breaches”) occurred during the international armed conflict and partial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  5. Radovan KARADZIC was required to abide by the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols thereto.
  6. Radovan KARADZIC is individually responsible for the crimes alleged against him in this indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute. Individual criminal responsibility includes planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Tribunal Statute.

  7. Radovan KARADZIC while holding the positions of superior authority as set out in the foregoing paragraphs, is also criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal. A superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinate(s) if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate(s) were about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

ADDITIONAL FACTS


  1. The SDS was one of the three ethnically oriented parties that emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990 in preparation for multi-party elections to be held in November of that year. From its inception, Radovan KARADZIC was the SDS party’s president, whilst Biljana PLAVSIC and Momcilo KRAJISNIK were leading party members. Each of the three parties was aligned with one of the three principal ethnic groups in Bosnia: the SDS was the principal Serb national party; the Party of Democratic Action (hereafter SDA) was the main Bosnian Muslim national party; the Croatian Democratic Community (hereafter HDZ) was the leading Croat national party. The results of the elections reflected the dominance of these three main national parties. At the Republic level, the SDA won the most seats in the Assembly, followed by the SDS and then the HDZ. The remaining seats were split between other parties, including the former Communist Party.
  2. The central idea within the SDS political platform, as articulated by its leaders, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, was the unity of all Serbs within Yugoslavia as the only way of protecting the Serbian national interests. This idea was related to the concept of a “Greater Serbia” which began to openly circulate in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter SFRY) in the late 1980s. The SDS regarded the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the federal Yugoslav system as a threat to the interests of the Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  3. The results of the November 1990 elections meant that, as time went on, the SDS would have had insufficient political authority to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia through democratic political processes. In the spring of 1991 the SDS began to organise certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina into formal regional structures through the concept of “Associations of Municipalities” which existed under the 1974 Yugoslav constitutional regime.

  4. Parallel to its organisational structure, which covered republic, regional, municipal and local community levels, in 1991 the SDS leadership developed a closed, covert internal system of command, control and communications. In this system, the main authority belonged to the central SDS party organs and, in particular, to the President and the Main Board of the party, thus ensuring complete control by the party’s leadership.
  5. In late June 1991, the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession of wars fought in Slovenia and Croatia after the two republics declared independence on 25 June. The JNA withdrew from Slovenia after a very short period, allowing for its secession from the SFRY. In Croatia, however, the fighting continued throughout the summer and into the autumn of 1991.

  6. For the war in Croatia, the JNA issued mobilisation orders to the male population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These orders were opposed by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which issued orders to the population that they did not have to respond to the mobilisation. As a result, very few Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats answered the call-up. On the other hand, Bosnian Serbs responded in large numbers, exhorted to do so by the SDS.

  7. As the war in Croatia continued, it appeared increasingly likely that Bosnia and Herzegovina would also declare its independence from the SFRY. The SDS however, wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain a part of Yugoslavia. As it became clear that they would not be able to hold Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Yugoslav federation, the SDS began in earnest the creation of a separate Serbian territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By September 1991 the SDS proclaimed one Serb Autonomous Region and four Serb Autonomous Districts (hereafter SAOs). The SAOs became the first territorial foundation on which the Serbian republic was to be founded.

  8. As viewed by the SDS leaders, a major problem in the creation and control of Serbian territory was the significant Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations that lived in areas the SDS claimed. Thus, a significant aspect of the plan to create a new Serbian state was the permanent removal or “ethnic cleansing” of nearly all of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations from those areas, allowing for the presence of only a small number of non-Serbs who would agree to the conditions for living in a Serb-dominated State.

  9. In the autumn of 1991, the JNA began to withdraw its forces out of Croatia and re-deploy them in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Working in conjunction with certain elements in the JNA, the SDS began to covertly arm the Bosnian Serb civilian population.

  10. A separate Bosnian Serb Assembly, dominated by the SDS, was founded on 24 October 1991 as the highest representative and legislative organ of Serbs in Bosnia.

  11. In late December 1991 the leaders of the SDS began preparations for the physical take-over of power in those municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs did not have clear control, and for the subsequent implementation of a general plan for ethnically cleansing the areas they considered to be Serbian. The take-overs were executed following instructions issued by the SDS leadership, often through Crisis Staffs that were brought into being for this purpose.
  12. The Crisis Staff was modelled on an entity that had existed as part of the defence system in the SFRY, and was designated to take over the functioning of the municipalities or republic government, as the case may have been, during times of war or a state of emergency when the Assembly, normally the highest authority of government, would not have been able to function.

  13. The Crisis Staffs began functioning in SDS-claimed municipalities in late December 1991. They operated at both the regional and municipal levels of authority as the bodies that would be responsible for the co-ordination of the execution of most of the operational phase of the plan for ethnic cleansing.

  14. On 31 May and 10 June 1992, the Presidency ordered the re-designation of the Crisis Staffs as War Presidencies and then War Commissions in the municipalities. The War Presidencies/War Commissions maintained the same structure and virtually the same authority as the Crisis Staffs, and were still commonly referred to by the public as Crisis Staffs.

  15. The Crisis Staffs were to cease operation when the Assemblies were able to meet or to conduct business again. The regular municipal organs would then resume operation, generally under the direction of the same SDS leaders. These municipal organs then approved or validated the actions of the Crisis Staffs.

  16. On 9 January 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed the “Serbian republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The territory of that republic was declared to include “the territories of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and Districts and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the genocide conducted against it in World War Two,” and it was declared to be part of the Yugoslav federal state.

  17. From late March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began to seize physical control of ethnically mixed municipalities that had been declared part of the Serbian state, including but not limited to the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9. These attacks and take-overs occurred in a similar, co-ordinated and planned manner. The attacks, take-overs and subsequent events were planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted by Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, War Commissions and other SDS and government authorities acting under the control and direction of the SDS leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC.

  18. Also on 12 May 1992 the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to create the VRS, effectively transforming the JNA units remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other armed forces working in concert in Bosnia and Herzegovina into commands of the new army. The Bosnian Serb Assembly appointed Ratko MLADIC as Commander of the VRS Main Staff. In this capacity Ratko MLADIC was directly subordinate to the Presidency.
  19. The JNA “officially” withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, but military operations directed against the non-Serb population continued to be carried out by the VRS and Bosnian Serb police. The JNA, which had been re-named the Yugoslav Army (hereafter VJ) during the SFRY’s reconstitution as the FRY in April 1992, continued to have strong links with the VRS. It provided critical combat, financial, and logistic support to the Bosnian Serb military effort. Many officers, commanders, soldiers, logistical centres and much equipment and supplies of the former JNA was left behind for Bosnian Serb use. Former JNA officers were transferred from their posts in JNA units to the same unit’s VRS successor and most remained in command of those units throughout the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The salaries of VRS officers continued to be paid by Belgrade. Additionally, from time to time after 19 May 1992, elements of the VJ had a direct role in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided critical combat support to the VRS.

 


_____________________

Carla Del Ponte

Prosecutor


Dated this 28th day of April 2000

At The Hague,

The Netherlands

Written by modernityblog

22/07/2008 at 00:26

Posted in Uncategorized

Très Swiss.

leave a comment »

I like small Linux distros, they make slow kit zip along and don’t have all of the baggage of that Microsoft crap, so I was very interested when I heard of SliTaz GNU/Linux which is less than 30 Mb as an ISO.

I had an old USB stick which is largely redundant because of its size, 128 Mb and I wondered of SliTaz would make it usable?

It did!

A simple USB boot and it positively sprinting out of the gate. It took 1 minute to set-up the networking, no hassle and another to bring up their (firefox based) browser, Minefield, what a winner.

Also, lookout for the new test version of AntiX Linux, at the Antix forum, damn good too.

Finally, for audio books in the public domain try LibriVox, a marvellous free service.

Written by modernityblog

18/07/2008 at 00:43

Posted in Uncategorized

Mansour Osanloo

leave a comment »

Harry Barnes reminds us that Mansour Osanloo has been incarcerated for over a year, also see Azarmehr’s blog.

Written by modernityblog

13/07/2008 at 23:20

Posted in Uncategorized

Bits Of Plastics?

leave a comment »

The commodification of celebrity and star personality has its costs as the web site awful plastic surgery demonstrates, don’t try this at home!

Written by modernityblog

13/07/2008 at 20:23

Posted in Uncategorized

Contraception Or Viagra?

leave a comment »

John McCain, presidential hopeful, is somewhat confused over the issue of the benefits of contraception over Viagra!

Hat tip: Tim

Written by modernityblog

11/07/2008 at 15:31

Posted in Uncategorized

Libel Action Against HP, part 1.

with one comment

Below is the HP post which is considered to be libellous by Mohammed Sawalha, so sue me Dean and Dean:

[I will post the full post and comments on the Page links above]


British Muslim Initiative: We Resent the Evil Jew in Britain

It is pretty well known that Islamists in the West habitually say one thing to their English speaking audience, and another thing to their Arabic speaking audience.

Here’s Mohammad Sawalha, President of the British Muslim Initiative, speaking to Al Jazeera in Arabic about his demonstration against last Sunday’s celebration of the foundation of the State of Israel:

The President of the British Muslim Initiative – Mohammad Sawalha – said in a speech to Al Jazeera:

“We, the Arab and Islamic community, gather here today to express our resentment at the celebrations by the Jewish community and the [evil Jew/Jewish evil] in Britain”

[والوبيل اليهودي في بريطانيا]

Translation by DaveM

Apart from the British Muslim Initiative, Sawalha has been active in a large number of other ventures. He is the past President of the Muslim Association of Britain. He was the founder of IslamExpo, and is registered as the holder of the IslamExpo domain name. He is also a trustee of the Finsbury Park Mosque: which was taken over from Abu Hamza by the Muslim Association of Britain, with the help of Detective Inspector Bob Lambert.

All of the organisations that Sawalha is associated with have one thing in common. They are fronts for Hamas/the Muslim Brotherhood.

Sawalha also was one of the signatories to the letter from various “Muslim organisations” endorsing Ken Livingstone: a large number of whom are closely associated with various Muslim Brotherhood organisations.

Sawalha was also one of the subjects of the BBC Panorama documentary on Hamas fundraising in the United Kingdom [better formatted here]. That documentary made the following claims:

  • Sawalha is said to have master minded much of Hamas’ political and military strategy.
  • Sawalha was one of the senior activists in the dawah portals of Hamas. He was involved, let’s say, with the background of the finance, the logistic assistance.
  • In London, Sawalha is alleged to have directed funds, both for Hamas’ armed wing, and for spreading its missionary dawah

Therefore, it is no surprise to hear him giving a speech to the Arabic media about “the evil Jew in Britain”.

Of course, you won’t hear the British Muslim Initiative saying anything like this in any of the many comment pieces Sawalha’s team write for the Guardian.

UPDATE

Al Jazeera has now changed the text to refer to “the Jewish Lobby”.

The original text contained the word الوبيل . It means “evil” or “noxious” or “dreaded” or “disasterous”. We’ve asked other Arabic speakers, and they’ve confirmed that, combined with the word “Jew”, the sense of the phrase is “Evil Jew” or “Jewish evil”.

That word has been replaced with “lobby”, اللوبي. The words don’t look at all similar. So this isn’t a spelling mistake.

If we wait a little bit longer, I bet they’ll change it to “the Zionist Lobby”.

UPDATE 2:

The British Muslim Initiative have published a press release about this article. They’ve posted it on here, but not on their own website!

British Muslim Initiative
http://www.bminitiative.com

News release
Attention: news desk
For immediate use

Zionist Racist website lies in order to justify its hate-rhetoric

While ‘Harry’s Place’ may not be known as a bastion of truth and balanced comment – not even in the remotest sense of these words – its latest blunder shows it as an entirely incompetent source of information.

In ‘reporting’ the anti-Israel demonstration that took place at Trafalgar Square on Sunday the 29th of June, the moderator of the said blog quoted BMI president Mohammed Sawalha’s comment to Al-Jazeera as: “We, the Arab and Islamic community, gather here today to express our resentment at the celebrations by the Jewish community and the evil/noxious Jew in Britain” – Translated by DaveM.

What is beyond doubt is that DaveM seems to be an entirely incapable and dangerously incompetent translator, clearly failing to understand and hence translate the simple word ‘Lobby’. This word is pronounced in Arabic identically to the way it is in English, and is written phonetically in identical style.

It is of course possible that DaveM and the moderators of this vile blog-space – which has made it its mission to attack Islam and Muslims in whatever underhand methods it can get away with – deliberately skewed the word ‘Lobby’ to turn it into some other word and make it seem as though it means ‘evil/noxious’, in order to portray not only Mohammed Sawalha, but BMI and all the projects that Mr. Sawalha is linked to, as ‘Jew-haters’ and ‘anti-Semitic’.

This was immediately picked up by the likes of Melanie Phillips who wrote in The Spectator, quoting this error and using it as fact to further her campaign to demonise an individual who has done for community relations and cultural dialogue far more than she can ever lay claim to.

Anas Altikriti, spokesman of BMI, commented earlier: ‘This particular blog-space and its moderators are nonentities and insignificant. However, its danger lies in that in the past some corners of our mainstream media have picked up on its drivel and used it as fact.

This is another example of not only very basic incompetence at play, but pure evil that sees no shame or wrong in plainly lying for the purpose of demonising certain individuals and organisations, regardless of reality or facts”.

BMI have alerted its legal advisors to this matter and will be monitoring the blog-site in question as well as any quoting of this error by any other media outlet, and will be pursuing measures to bring those who do to account.

Hilariously, their line is that we have:

“deliberately skewed the word ‘Lobby’ to turn it into some other word and make it seem as though it means ‘evil/noxious’”

They could have said “Oh, he’s been misquoted by Al Jazeera – in Arabic, “Jewish evil” sounds really like “Jewish Lobby”. Or even “It’s just a spelling mistake – there are only a few letters’ difference between “evil” and “lobby”.

Here is a screen shot of the Al Jazeera article. It is very clear that the phrase “Jewish Lobby” did not appear in the original article. Until it was amended:

15gqs91.jpg

So, now I’m being threatened with legal action. That’s always a good tactic: as David Irving discovered.

Given that the BMI is the sister organisation of Hamas, and Mohammad Sawalha has been identified by the BBC as a senior Hamas activist, I should be grateful that they’re not threatening to send round “martyrs” to explode themselves in front of me.

Put it this way. There’s clear evidence what the Al Jazeera article originally said. It would be wholly unsurprising that a man who is apparently a Hamas activist would give an interview in Arabic in which he railed against “Jewish evil”. That is, after all, one of Hamas’ favourite themes.

And if the argument is that he was demonstrating against the “Jewish Community” and the “Jewish Lobby” rather than “Jewish Evil”… well, that’s not a great defence, is it?

Written by modernityblog

10/07/2008 at 18:40

Posted in Uncategorized

Silencing Opponents.

leave a comment »

British libel laws are often used to silence opponents and Harry’s Place faces a libel action from Dean & Dean on behalf of Mohammed Sawalha.

Remembering the previous use of libel laws to shut down legitimate debate (Craig Murray vs. Alisher Usmanov ) I shall be republishing in full the complete posts from HP, so Mr. Mohammed Sawalha you can sue me as well.

Update: see “Sue us too, you anti-semitic scum!” at Shiraz Socialist.

Written by modernityblog

10/07/2008 at 15:23

Posted in Uncategorized

Almost Forgot.

leave a comment »

There was a time when I followed elections with some interest, but nowadays I am losing track of things, so I am grateful to Fresh is Grass for reminding me of the Redbridge by-election next week – stop the BNP.

Update: Searchlight are debating these issues at www.hopenothate.org.uk
[Hat tip: Shiraz Socialist ]

Written by modernityblog

05/07/2008 at 02:33

Posted in Uncategorized

Eve Garrard

leave a comment »

Trade unions have, for many years, fought against discrimination, both racial and gender-based prejudices, therefore it is all the more extraordinary when union members feel that they are being discriminated against or the environment within the union is such that a hostile atmosphere exists, so it is with the University and College Union.

The last few years have seen activists leaving UCU and its forerunner, the Association of University Teachers, one of the most articulate was Shalom Lappin, here’s an extract:

“…
For the past several years an ugly campaign of anti-Jewish provocation has been building on the margins of the Israel hate-fest that the boycott supporters have been promoting on campuses throughout the UK. These events have coincided with ungainly incidents in the broader political domain (Livingstone’s ludicrous antics, for example) and in the media. Jewish students and staff have been targeted for abuse in a way that can no longer be simply passed off as vigorous criticism of Israel. Three students on the NUS Executive recently resigned over the failure of their union to address these matters. The National Executive of the AUT has been equally indifferent to the steady rise of ethnic tensions and the spillover of anti-Israel activity into raw anti-Semitism.”

His reply to a request from UCU for him to reconsider his decision:
“…
The result is an annual boycott pogrom that distracts attention from the pressing concerns of people working in the British university system. It creates massive divisions among the membership, and it generates prolonged turmoil that undermines the credibility of the union.”

The latest UCU member to resign is Eve Garrard:

“Dear Sally Hunt

In spite of my longstanding commitment to Union membership, the recent actions of the UCU are finally driving me out of it. I find that I cannot remain in an institution which sets out to discriminate against its Jewish members.

The passing of Motion 25 at the June Congress is the central, though by no means the only, example of this discrimination. It was clear to anyone who watched the vote take place that the Union delegates, and the National Executive, were determined to punish Israel. They felt that it was not sufficient for them to criticise it – as was, in their view, appropriate for countries like Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe. Nothing but punishment would do for the Jewish state, and hence it, and it alone, must be the target of a boycott motion.

It has been loudly declared, by yourself and other members of the NEC, that Motion 25 is not a boycott motion. This is probably untrue, as has been pointed out by various legal commentators. But at the very least, Motion 25, proposed and supported by many of the same individuals and political groupings as have tried to force through previous boycott motions against Israel, is a call to prepare for a boycott. The full-strength version of a boycott having been found in 2007 to fall foul of the Race Relations Act, the Union has now resorted to boycott-lite in the hope of evading legal culpability. This proto-boycott received overwhelming support from the delegates and the Executive Committee; indeed so determined were they to pass the motion that they refused to take the risk of allowing the general membership to vote on it. The fact that the UCU is once again taking legal advice to see if the motion can be implemented is unpleasantly clear evidence that it’s the fear of legal intervention, and only that fear, which is preventing the Union from doing what it really wants to do, namely single out Israel for punitive treatment.

This treatment would be discriminatory, since it would impact quite disproportionately, and for no good reason, on Jewish academics and Jewish members of the Union. But the behaviour of the Union, before, during and after Congress, forces me to see that my Union is unconcerned about this. What it really wants to do involves discriminating against Jewish academics, and this fact doesn’t deter it in the least.

The primary impact of Motion 25, as with previous boycott motions, will not be to harm Israel, whose academics will simply transfer their valuable contributions to other, less prejudiced, collaborators. Nor will it have any discernible impact on Palestinians, except perhaps a negative one. The discriminatory procedure which the motion mandates will certainly discredit UK academia. But its principal impact will be on British Jews and Jewish academics. Most, though not all, Jews in the UK, and most Jewish academics, support the existence of Israel, and are extremely concerned that it has been singled out for hostile treatment in this way. Most of them feel that the palpable hostility to Israel and its supporters displayed by the pro-boycotters is based on an astonishingly one-sided, partial, and often quite false account of the troubled history of the Middle East; and that the principal effect, and quite possibly the principal aim, of the boycott project is to demonise and delegitimise Jewish national identity and self-determination. Most Jewish academics feel that Jews have as much right to self-determination and national aspirations as any other people, and that the UCU has become a place where such rights are being dismissed and denied. They increasingly feel that the Union is no longer a place where they can be as much at home as any other members, and that its increasingly chilling attitude to Jewish self-determination is creating an unwelcoming and even hostile environment for people with their political sympathies. And the Executive of the Union has made no attempt whatever to address such concerns. It has treated the worries and fears of its Jewish members with contemptuous neglect.

The discussion of the boycott project on the UCU activists’ list has exemplified much of what I have just described. There has been a constant deployment of some of the most traditional stereotypes of anti-Semitism, thinly concealed under the figleaf of anti-Zionism. Repeated (and demonstrably false) claims have been made that Israel is committing genocide, and is comparable to the Nazis. Those who have not shared the dominant hostility to Israel have been compared to members of an alien species. It has been explicitly asserted by Union activists that those members who resist this demonising of the Jewish state, and who are concerned about the double standards being deployed in the boycott project, are manipulatively trying to distract others from Israel’s crimes, and are indeed part of a conspiracy to do so. The Union has failed to protect its Jewish members from this constant vilifying of Jewish self-determination. Formal complaints about the creation of an atmosphere hostile to many Jews have been dismissed by the Union as groundless. Even more worryingly, complaints which have been made about the possibility of institutional anti-Semitism have not even been addressed by the Union.

The UCU purports to be concerned about equality: it explicitly claims to ‘put equality at the heart of its activities’. But equal treatment is not provided to its Jewish members. It is inconceivable that the constant deployment of racist tropes against members of other ethnic minorities would be regarded with complaisance by UCU functionaries. The leadership of the UCU has not only remained silent about such things where Jews are concerned, it has given their deployers cover and protection by declaring that criticism of Israel isn’t anti-Semitic ‘as such’. The Union prefers to ignore the very obvious fact that some criticism of Israel certainly is anti-Semitic, and that in any case boycotts aren’t a form of criticism at all but rather a form of exclusion and ostracism. The use of glaring double standards, whereby Israel and its supporters are condemned and punished where other and far worse polities are ignored or decorously reprimanded, is something else to which the Union turns a studiously blind eye. But this is discrimination, against an ethnic group for whom such discrimination is a familiar part of their history.

The Union purports to be antiracist: it asserts that ‘racism is widespread throughout further and higher education’, and that the ‘UCU is opposed to race discrimination in whatever form it takes’. But it doesn’t seem to be opposed to current race discrimination against Jews (except when it can be safely attributed to Nazis), and it does seem to believe that the UCU itself is entirely free of the racism which it regards as so widespread elsewhere. It appears to be impervious to the possibility that its own practices are open to question under that heading. Its peevish and self-satisfied response to criticism from the All-Party Inquiry into Anti-Semitism was a salutary example of this, as was the Union’s flat refusal to meet the OSCE Special Representative on combating anti-Semitism. Its officials declared that they were too busy to meet the Representative. Perhaps Union personnel should announce that they’re opposed to race discrimination in whatever form it takes, except when they’re really busy. Even when it is pointed out to the Union, in the clearest possible terms, that its proposed actions constitute institutional discrimination against Jews, it is so determined to persist in those actions that it spends very large sums of its members’ money trying to find out if there is some way in which it can single out the Jewish state for hostile attention and still remain within the law.

The UCU’s obsessional determination to ostracise and punish Israel, and its persistent indifference to the concerns and fears of its Jewish members, have created an atmosphere within the Union which is hostile both to its Jewish members and to its non-Jewish members who support the existence of the Jewish state, and do not believe that it is the sole locus of blame for the problems of the Middle East. I understand that some Jews will want to remain in the Union and try to reform it from within, and I wish them well in this project. But I, like many others, can no longer bear the shame and embarrassment of belonging to an institution which is willing to discriminate against Jews, and whose readiness to do so is supported by leading members of its Executive Committee. Some of these members were elected on an explicitly anti-boycott platform, but nonetheless went on to support this latest attempt to boycott Israel. That includes, to her shame, the President of the Union, Linda Newman; and also, to your shame, the General Secretary, yourself. This Union is no longer a fit place for those who think that Jews have the same rights of self-determination, self-defence, and national identity as other peoples do, and I hereby resign from it.

Eve Garrard”

These and other instances should sound alarm bells with trade unionists, because when Jews are consciously leaving a Union because they don’t feel it is a fit and proper place for them to be in, then something is very wrong with that Union.

Update: see Fresh is Grass

Written by modernityblog

01/07/2008 at 14:04

Posted in Uncategorized

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 42 other followers